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Abstract
The paper analyzes the link between financial constraints and firm export behavior.
Our main finding is that firms enjoying better financial health are more likely to
become exporters. The result contrasts with the previous empirical literature which
found evidence that export participation improves firm financial health, but not that
export starters display any ex-ante financial advantage. On the contrary, we find that
financial constraints act as a barrier to export participation. Better access to external
financial resources increases the probability to start exporting and also shortens the
time before firms decide to serve foreign customers. This finding has important policy
implications as it suggests that, in presence of financial markets imperfections, public
intervention can be called for to help efficient but financially constrained firms to
overcome the sunk entry costs into export markets and expand their activities abroad.
Keywords: Export; Firm heterogeneity; Financial constraints; Sunk costs
JEL Classification: F14; G32; L25; D92
1 Introduction
The paper analyzes the link between financial factors and firm export behavior exploit-
ing a large dataset on French manufacturing firms. There are several reasons making
this a relevant issue. With the rise of the ‘global economy’ export performance is in-
creasingly perceived as a key aspect of economic performance, both for firms and for the
entire macroeconomic outlook. In the meantime, academics have been paying increasing
attention to firm level studies. Wider access to firm level data, greater computational
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capabilities, as well as theoretical advances that depart from the representative agent
framework have led economists to recognize that aggregate dynamics are the result of
microeconomic behavior. Thus, a clear grasp of the latter becomes crucial to understand
the former and to design appropriate policies.
In this paper we refer to export behavior in terms of both export participation and
export intensity. A vast empirical literature documents a substantial heterogeneity across
firms (ISGEP, 2008). Differences in firm export behavior has mostly been explained in
terms of systematic differences between firms in productivity levels. We rely on the idea
of heterogeneity of financial constraints to account for export behavior.
Our theoretical background is casted in terms of the recent ‘new-new’ trade theory
(Melitz, 2003) which emphasizes both firm heterogeneity and the relevance of sunk entry
costs into export markets.1 Once extended to allow for imperfect capital markets, these
models show that financial variables can play a key role in determining firm export behavior
(Chaney, 2005; Manova, 2006). Indeed, the existence of sunk entry costs into export
markets brings about the question of the financing of such expenditures that, by their
very nature, are not matched by contemporaneous revenues. In the presence of financial
market imperfections, it may well be —and this is the main research question from which
we start— that only those firms that can successfully overcome this financial problem
become exporters. In fact, this would be consistent with the evidence of internationalized
firms outperforming non exporters in several dimensions as shown in the large literature
triggered by Bernard and Jensen (1995).
Rather than supporting this prior, the scant empirical evidence on the topic suggests
rather that exporting improves firm access to financial markets either by reducing in-
formational asymmetries or by reducing exposure to demand-side shocks risk through
diversification (Ganesh-Kumar et al., 2001; Campa and Shaver, 2002; Greenaway et al.,
2007). In what follows we present an evaluation of the self-selection and ex-post effects
based on a large panel of French manufacturing firms. Our contribution is twofold. First,
we propose a new way to measure the degree of financial constraint (based on the mul-
tivariate index proposed by Musso and Schiavo, 2008), which we believe is superior to
existing methodologies. Second, we shed light on the role played by access to external
financial resources in shaping firm export behavior. In so doing, we do not limit ourselves
to export participation, but we also look at export intensity.
We can summarize our main findings as follows. First, firms starting to export display
a significant ex-ante financial advantage compared to their non exporting counterparts.
1The assumption that entry into foreign markets involves large sunk costs is not a novelty in the trade
literature: see for instance Baldwin (1988); Roberts and Tybout (1997). This assumption is supported by
an expanding empirical literature (see, among others, Bernard and Wagner, 2001; Das et al., 2001; Tybout,
2001; Bellone et al., 2008b).
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This in consistent with the idea that limited access to external financial funds may prevent
firms from selling their products abroad. Second, we do not find significant evidence of any
beneficial effect after entry into export markets. Hence, firms that start serving foreign
markets do not improve their financial health as a consequence of exporting. When we dig
deeper on the relation between financial factors and the decision to start exporting, we find
that better access to financial markets increases the probability of firm internationalization,
and also shortens the time before that happens. Finally, among the subsample of export
starters, there is a negative relationship between export intensity and financial health.
Considering the former as a proxy for the number of destinations served, our results
suggest that entering simultaneously into many different markets entails larger sunk costs
and results in a deterioration of a firm financial status.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next Section presents an overview of the
literature on financial constraints and firm export behavior. Section 3 presents the data,
discusses the shortcomings of usual strategies employed to measure financial constraints,
and illustrates the methodology adopted here. In Section 4, we test the two hypotheses
that less constrained firms self-select into exporting, and that selling abroad improves firm
financial health. We then look more in details at the role played by financial variables
in shaping the decision to export: these results are discussed in Section 5. Section 6
concludes and draws some policy implications.
2 A glance at the existing literature
In presence of imperfect capital markets, one can figure out at least two reasons why
exporting firms should be less financially constrained than non exporting firms.
First, if firms have to incur large sunk entry costs to enter into export markets, then
enterprises unable to secure enough funds may be unable to serve foreign markets. This
implies that only less constrained firms will be able to start exporting: such an idea is
formalized by Chaney (2005) which adds liquidity constraints to a model of international
trade with heterogeneous firms (in the spirit of Melitz, 2003). In fact, the new-new trade
theory postulates that a large part of trade barriers faced by firms take the form of fixed
costs to be paid up-front. The empirical literature documents significant hysteresis effects
associated with firm export participation and interprets this as signalling the relevance of
sunk entry costs: see for instance Roberts and Tybout (1997) for Colombia, Bernard and
Wagner (2001) for Germany, Campa (2004) for Spain, Bernard and Jensen (2004) for the
US. Das et al. (2001) estimate a structural model to quantify sunk costs and conclude that
entry costs into export are substantial. In the business literature, Moini (2007) reports
results form a survey among US non exporters, where firms claim their primary obstacle
to initiate an export program is the presence of high up-front costs.
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Second, the very fact of exporting could improve firm access to external financial funds.
Again there are different candidate explanations for such an effect. Exporting firms should
in principle enjoy more stable cash flows, as they benefit from international diversification
of their sales. Hence, under the assumption that international business cycles are only
imperfectly correlated, exporting reduces vulnerability to demand-side shocks. This is the
argument put forward by Campa and Shaver (2002) and Bridges and Guariglia (2008).
Alternatively, selling in international markets can be considered as a sign of efficiency
and competitiveness by domestic investors. In a context of information asymmetries —
which lie at the heart of financial markets imperfections— exporting would thus represent
a clear signal about sent by the firm to external investors. Since only the best firms
export —as we know very well by the large body of empirical literature triggered by
Bernard and Jensen (1995), and as demonstrated theoretically by Melitz (2003)— then
exporting represents by itself a sign of efficiency and a costless way for creditors to assess
the potential profitability of an investment. Ganesh-Kumar et al. (2001) find that this kind
of mechanism is especially relevant in an emerging market such India, characterized by low
institutional quality. Finally, exporting is likely to open up access to international financial
markets as well, at least those pertaining to the destination countries. In anything, foreign
exchanges revenues represent a better collateral to access external funds in foreign financial
markets. Once again this channel probably applies more directly to emerging economies,
as postulated by Tornell and Westermann (2003).2
Empirically, Campa and Shaver show that investment is less sensitive to cash flow
for the group of always exporters compared to the group of never exporters. Since in
presence of perfect capital markets investment and cash flow should not be correlated,
investment cash flow sensitivity is often regarded as a measure of financial constraints
(more on this in Section 3.1 below). Also, when they consider firms that move in and
out from export markets, the two authors find these appear more constrained during the
periods when they only deal with local customers. Hence, they conclude that exporting
can help firms to reduce their financial constraints. One possible weakness of the paper
lies in the fact that export intensity plays no role in the play. In fact, if the diversification
and the signaling channels were actually at work, one would expect a positive correlation
between the how much a firm export (relative to its total sales) and its ability to reduce
financial constraints. Yet, Campa and Shaver (2002) fail to find such a relationship.
Two recent papers provide further evidence backing the idea that exporting exerts a
positive effect on firm financial health. Working with a large panel of UK manufactur-
2The relevance of the institutional context is witnessed by a recent work by Espanol (2003) who find
exporting firms in Argentina more financially constrained than their competitors only serving the domestic
market. This can be explained by the appreciation of the local currency in the early 1990s, which resulted
in a profit squeeze for exporters, and weakened their balance sheets.
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ing firms Greenaway et al. (2007) look for a causal nexus between the two variables, and
conclude that causality runs from export to financial health. In other words, they find
no evidence in favor of the hypothesis of less constrained firms self-selecting into export
activities, but rather strong evidence favoring a beneficial effect of the latter on financial
health.3 In particular, they find no significant difference in the average liquidity (or lever-
age) ratio of export starters and never exporting firms. On the contrary, when comparing
continuous exporters and starters, they find the former to enjoy a better average financial
health over the sample period. Hence, they conclude that exporting does improve firm
financial status, since participating to export for longer periods makes enterprises more
liquid and less leveraged.
Bridges and Guariglia (2008) focus on survival among UK firms. More specifically,
they look at the interrelations between global engagement (of which export is just one
possible manifestation), financial health and survival. They find that lower collateral
and higher leverage do result in higher failure probabilities, but only for purely domestic
firms. They interpret this as evidence that international activities shields firms from
financial constraints or, to put it in the terminology used so far, that internationalization
is beneficial from a financial point of view.
Despite this body of literature, we claim that the issue is not fully settled yet. We
base this statement on different considerations. First, the way financial constraints are
identified and measured remains largely debated. As discussed below, the usefulness of
investment cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financial constraints is increasingly chal-
lenged and recent theoretical works cast doubts also on other widespread proxies. Second,
the role played by export intensity has been largely disregarded so far and remains to be
determined. Last, the econometric specifications used in the literature appears not always
consistent with the stated goal of testing the relevance of self-selection into export markets
and of the existence of a beneficial effect of internationalization on firm financial health.
3 Data and methodology
We use data from two main sources. Both of them collects information on French firms,
though their coverage is somehow different. The first (Enqueˆte Annuelle d’Entreprises –
EAE ) is an annual survey that gathers balance sheets information for all manufacturing
firms with at least 20 employees.4 The second source of information is theDIANE database
3We will discuss the issues related to the measurement of financial constrained in Section 3.1 below.
For the moment, it suffices to say that Greenaway et al. (2007) use the liquidity ratio and the leverage
ratio to proxy for financial constraints.
4The survey is conducted by the French Ministry of Industry. The surveyed unit is the legal (not the
productive) unit, which means that we are dealing with firm-level data. To investigate the role of financial
constraints on growth and survival, firm, rather than plant level data seem indeed appropriate.
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published by Bureau van Dijk, which collects data on over 1 million firms. It provides
us with many financial variables absent from the EAE survey. Merging the two datasets
yields around 170,000 firm/year observations, stemming from an unbalanced panel of over
25,000 manufacturing enterprises followed over the period 1993 – 2005.
3.1 Measuring financial constraints
The way financial constraints are measured is a very sensitive issue in the literature inves-
tigating the link between financial variables and firm behavior. Theory offers only limited
guidance in this domain, so that a clear-cut consensus has still to emerge. Under perfect
capital markets, internal and external sources of financial funds should be perfectly substi-
tutable (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), so that the availability of internal funds should not
affect investment decisions. Yet, when a standard investment equation is augmented with
cash flow availability, the fit of the equation is improved. The most common proxy for
financial constraints is thus the sensitivity of investment to cash flow. This methodology
builds on Fazzari et al. (1988) who first define firms as financially constrained or uncon-
strained based on their dividend payout ratio, then show that likely constrained firms
(low divided payout) display higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. A number of sub-
sequent studies find supporting evidence using different variables to identify constrained
firms (see for instance Bond and Meghir, 1994; Gilchrist and Himmelberg, 1995; Chirinko
and Schaller, 1995).
On the contrary, Devereux and Schiantarelli (1990) find that larger firms (less likely to
be constrained) exhibit a higher cash flow coefficient in the regression equation, even after
controlling for sector heterogeneity. But it is only with the work by Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) that the usefulness of investment-cash flow sensitivity as a measure of financial
constraint has been definitely questioned. Since then, other authors have reported evidence
of a negative relation between investment-cash flow sensitivity and financial constraints
(for instance Kadapakkam et al., 1998; Cleary, 2006).
Alternative strategies consist of simply classifying firms according to various proxies
of informational asymmetries (as these represent the main source of financial markets
imperfections). Hence, variables such as size, age, dividend policy, membership in a group
or conglomerate, existence of bond rating, and concentration of ownership (see for instance
Devereux and Schiantarelli, 1990; Hoshi et al., 1991; Bond and Meghir, 1994; Gilchrist and
Himmelberg, 1995; Chirinko and Schaller, 1995; Cleary, 2006) are used to capture ways to
cope with imperfect information, which hinders access to capital markets. Other papers
(e.g. Becchetti and Trovato, 2002) use survey data where firms give a self-assessment of
their difficulty to obtain external financial funds.
The major weakness of these strategies —as already noted by Hubbard (1998)— is
that most of the criteria tend to be time invariant whereas one can imagine that firms
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switch between being constrained or unconstrained depending on overall credit conditions,
investment opportunities and idiosyncratic shocks. As a further potential problem, we
add that all the abovementioned works rely on a unidimensional definition of financial
constraint, i.e. they assume that a single variable can effectively identify the existence
of a constraint, which is viewed as a binary phenomenon either in place or not. Notable
exceptions are the works by Cleary (1999), Lamont et al. (2001) and Whited and Wu
(2006). The first paper derives a financial score by estimating the probability of a firm
reducing its dividend payments (viewed as a sign of financial constraints) conditional on a
set of variables that are observable also in the case of unlisted firms. Lamont et al. (2001)
build a multivariate index by collapsing into a single measure five variables weighted using
regression coefficients taken from Kaplan and Zingales (1997).The main problem here rests
with the need to extrapolate results derived from a small sample of US firms and apply
them to a larger and different population.5 Based on a structural model, Whited and Wu
(2006) use the shadow price of capital to proxy for financial constraints.
In the paper, we rely on four different measures of financial constraints. The first two
are the liquidity ratio and the leverage ratio as employed by Greenaway et al. (2007).6 We
find two main shortcomings in these measures. First they only capture one dimension of
access to financial markets: a firm may be liquid but nonetheless present a bad financial
situation; on the other hand strong fundamentals may compensate for a temporary short-
age of liquid assets. Second, both ratios may suffer from some endogeneity. In other words,
there are no clear-cut theoretical priors on the relation between either liquidity or lever-
age and financial constraints. While generally regarded a sign of financial health, firms
may be forced to be liquid by the fact that they are unable to access external resources.
In fact, a recent theoretical contribution by Almeida et al. (2004) shows that financially
constrained firms tend to hoard cash, so that liquidity would be associated with financial
constraints, not lack thereof. In a similar vein, a high leverage, while signalling potential
dangers, suggests also that the firm has enjoyed, at least in the recent past, wide access
to external financial funds. Hence, one could argue that highly leveraged firms are not
financially constrained.7
To account for these potential problems, we build two other measures of financial
health according to the methodology first proposed by Musso and Schiavo (2008). They
5Furthermore, one of the variables needed to compute the index is Tobin’s Q, whose use as a proxy for
investment opportunities has often been criticized.
6The liquidity ratio is defined as a firm’s current assets minus its short-term debt over total assets; the
leverage ratio as a firm’s short-term debt over current assets.
7A further problem is that leverage and liquidity appear as the financial variables best discriminating
between exporting and non exporting firms in the sample analyzed by Greenaway et al. (2007). Therefore,
one runs the risk of ending-up with some sort of a built-in relation between these two financial variables
and export status (see Greenaway et al., 2005, for details on the choice of the financial variables).
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exploit information coming from seven variables: size (total assets), profitability (return on
total assets), liquidity (current asset over current liabilities), cash flow generating ability,8
solvency (own funds over total liabilities), trade credit over total assets, and repaying
ability (financial debt over cash flow).9
For each variable, we scale each firm/year observation for the corresponding 2-digit
NACE sector average and then assign to it a number corresponding to the quintiles of the
distribution in which it falls.10 The resulting information for each of the seven variables (a
number ranging from 1 to 5) is then collapsed into a single index in two alternative ways:
(i) a simple sum of the seven numbers (Score A); (ii) a count of the number of variables
for which the firm/year lies in the first or second quintiles (Score B).11 In both cases the
index is then rescaled to lie on a common 1–10 range.
Table 1: Correlations between Financial Constraints indexes
Pearson’s r and Spearman Rho Correlation Coefficients
Liquidity ratio Leverage ratio Score A Score B
Liquidity ratio – -0.98 0.49 0.44
Leverage ratio -0.92 – -0.53 -0.47
Score A 0.46 -0.44 – 0.90
Score B 0.41 -0.40 0.91 –
Numbers in italics denote Spearman rho correlation coefficients
The correlations between the four measures of financial constraints are presented in
Table 1. Both the Pearson’s and the Spearman correlation coefficients are reported, respec-
tively below and above the main diagonal of the correlation matrix. Leverage and liquidity
are strongly negatively correlated: more liquid firms are also less leveraged, meaning that
these two measures of financial health go hand in hand. Something similar happens for the
two multivariate scores: irrespective of the way information is combined firms are ranked
in a very similar order in terms of access to external financial resources. This results in
a Spearman rho correlation of 0.90, while Pearson’s correlation coefficient reaches 0.91.
Hence, Table 1 suggests that the two ratios, and the two scores provide very similar in-
formation. On the other hand, measuring financial constraints by means of a ratio or of
8This is the maximum amount of resources that a firm can devote to self-financing, and corresponds to
the French capacite´ d’autofinancement.
9They are selected on the basis of their performance in existing studies, and their perceived importance
in determining ease of access to external financial funds.
10Sectoral averages are taken to account for industry-specific differences in financial variables. Further-
more, to account for the presence of outliers we trim observations lying in the top and bottom 0.5% of the
distribution for each the seven variables.
11We have tried also other ways to combine the information, with identical results. Additional details
are available upon request.
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a multivariate index provides us with a different picture of the phenomenon at stake. In
what follows we will concentrate on the liquidity ratio and on Score A only: both measures
are increasing in financial health (contrary to leverage), which simplifies the discussion.
Results are qualitatively unchanged if one uses the leverage ratio and Score B.12
3.2 Firm productivity
In the following empirical analysis we will often use measures of total factor productivity
(TFP) to control for the existing heterogeneity among firms. TFP is computed using
the so-called multilateral productivity index first introduced by Caves et al. (1982) and
extended by Good et al. (1997). This methodology consists of computing the TFP index
for firm i at time t as follows:
lnTFPit = ln Yit − ln Yt +
t∑
τ=2
(
ln Yτ − ln Yτ−1
)
−


N∑
n=1
1
2
(Snit + Snt) (ln Xnit − ln Xnt)
+
t∑
τ=2
N∑
n=1
1
2
(Snτ + Snτ−1) (ln Xnτ − ln Xnτ−1)


(1)
where Yit denotes the real gross output of firm i at time t using the set of N inputs Xnit,
where input X is alternatively capital stocks (K), labor in terms of hours worked (L) and
intermediate inputs (M). Snit is the cost share of input Xnit in the total cost.
13 Subscripts
τ and n are indices for time and inputs, respectively, and upper bar denote sample means.
This index makes the comparison between any two firm-year observations possible because
each firm’s inputs and outputs are calculated as deviations from a reference firm. The
reference firm is a hypothetical firm that varies across industries14 with outputs and inputs
computed as the geometric means of outputs and inputs over all observations and input
cost-based shares computed as an arithmetic mean of cost shares over all observations.
This non parametric measure of relative productivity has been popularized in the export-
productivity literature by the contributions of Aw et al. (2000), and Delgado et al. (2002).
4 Export and finance: self-selection or ex-post benefit?
We start our econometric analysis by explicitly testing the two hypotheses mentioned
above, namely that less constrained firms self-select into export, and the possibility that
exporting improves financial health. We then move to study the causal link running
12This second set of results is not reported but remains available upon request.
13See Bellone et al. (2008a) for more details on the method and a full description of the variables.
14Firms are allocated to one of the following 14 two-digit industries: Clothing and footwear; Printing and
Publishing; Pharmaceuticals; House equipment and furnishings; Automobile; Transportation Machinery;
Machinery and Mechanical equipment; Electrical and electronic equipment; Mineral industry; Textile;
Wood and paper; Chemicals; Metallurgy, Iron and Steel; Electric and Electronic components.
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from financial variables to the decision of first exporting and, finally, we look at whether
financial constraints play any role in determining export intensity.
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the whole sample and also for different types of
firms. We classify firms according to their export status separating those which export
throughout the sample period (Continuous Exporters), those not exporting initially but
entering foreign markets between 1993 and 2005 (Export Starters), and those always
serving the domestic market only (Never Exporters).
Consistently with the large empirical literature on export and performance (started
by Bernard and Jensen, 1995, and by now counting an endless number of replications)
we find that exporters tend to be larger and more productive, as well as to pay higher
wages. Similarly, exporting firms appear more liquid and display easier access to external
financial funds as measured by Score A. Export starters lie somewhat in the middle of the
two groups. The last column of the Table reports a F-test for equality of means across the
three groups. The F-statistics are always larger than the 1% critical values, thus rejecting
the null hypothesis of equal means across the different types of firms.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics
All Continuous Export Never
Firms Exporters Starters Exporters F-stat
Employees 88.083 115.839 59.672 56.799 1,477.65***
TFP 0.997 1.003 0.990 0.992 85.57***
Wage per employee 0.103 0.107 0.099 0.091 515.14***
Score A 5.620 5.825 5.448 5.261 1,133.34***
Liquidity ratio 0.293 0.320 0.273 0.240 727.78***
Observations 167,597 85,720 63,402 18,475
On average, continuous exporters are double the size of non exporting firms in terms of
employees, they pay salaries that are 17% higher and are 33% more liquid. The difference
between starters and never exporters are much lower and, in terms of productivity the
equality of means cannot be rejected.
4.2 The ex-ante financial advantage of future exporters
We start by comparing ex-ante financial health for exporters and non exporters. This tells
us whether future exporters were less financially constrained than their non exporting
counterparts even before entering foreign markets. The comparison is performed with
firms belonging to the same industry and sharing similar characteristics in terms of size
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and efficiency. The econometric specification is adapted from the literature on export and
performance (Bernard and Wagner, 1997; Bernard and Jensen, 1999), where this kind of
empirical exercises are routinely performed. We focus our attention only on firms that do
not exports in t−1 (or from t−3 to t−1), but may export in t. Hence t is the year of entry
into foreign markets (in the case of export starters), while we set it equal to the median
year for never exporters.15 The comparison is performed one and three years before entry
into export markets. Specifically, we estimate:
FINi,t−s = α+ βEXPit + γZi,t−s + εit (2)
where FIN is either Score A or the liquidity ratio, EXP is the dummy for export status,
and Z a vector of controls that comprises Size (captured by the log of Employment,
measured in terms of total hours worked), productivity (TFP ), and a set of industry-year
dummies.
It must be emphasized that Equation (2) does not test for a causal relationship. Rather,
it allows us to evaluate the strength of the pre-entry premium —i.e. to see to what
extent firms that export in time t were already less financially constrained 1 and 3 years
before entering foreign markets— by means of a simple t-test on the significance of the β
coefficient. Results are presented in Table 3.
Table 3: Self-selection into exporting by less constrained firms
Score A Liquidity ratio
t-1, t t-3, t t-1, t t-3, t
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Export 0.161*** 0.206** 0.017* 0.003
[0.052] [0.095] [0.010] [0.016]
log Empl.t−s 0.190*** 0.073 0.006 -0.028**
[0.041] [0.068] [0.008] [0.012]
log TFPt−s 2.809*** 2.893*** 0.356*** 0.424***
[0.141] [0.249] [0.026] [0.043]
Observations 5772 2171 5772 2171
R-squared 0.113 0.159 0.075 0.131
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
When access to financial resources is measured by means of Score A, the coefficient
of the export dummy is positive and significantly different from zero both in t − 1 and
in t − 3. The better financial health of future exporters is less pronounced in terms of
liquidity: they appear more liquid one year before entry, but not 3 years before.
15This means that we only focus on export starters (which have not been exporting before) and never
exporters (which represent the control group).
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Overall, Table 3 provides convincing evidence that firms deciding to enter into foreign
markets do enjoy better financial health ex ante. As discussed above, we claim that
liquidity captures just one aspect of firm ability to access external financial resources, and
we tend to give more credit to the multivariate index Score A. Let us note that equation
(2) is estimated taking into account both successful exporters (i.e. those firms that keep
exporting ever since their entry into foreign markets) and firms that stop exporting after
a few years. This reduces potential sample selection biases and reinforces our results since
it works against the hypothesis of self-selection.
4.3 Detecting ex-post effects
The results from the previous section suggest that less constrained firms tend to become
exporters. This does not rule out the possibility that internationalization further boosts
firm financial health. Here we look at the extent to which this happens while disregarding
the specific reason behind the phenomenon: this is to say that we do not ask whether it
is a diversification rather than a signaling effect that matter.
Once again we stick to an empirical specification taken from Bernard and Jensen
(1999). The idea is very simple and consists in running a regression of the change in finan-
cial variables on initial export status and initial firm characteristics. From the previous
section we know that exporters enjoy better access to external funds: if export participa-
tion is beneficial, then we should observe a differential in the way financial variables move
after exporting firms have started to serve foreign markets. We focus on a subsample
made of newly internationalized firms (export starters) and purely domestic enterprises,
and we estimate the following equation:
∆%FINi,t+s/t+q = α+ βEXPi,t + γZi,t + εi,t (3)
where ∆%FINi,t+s/t+q identifies the growth rate of the financial variable between time
t + s and t + q, whit t being the first year of export. The coefficient β represents the
increase in the growth rate of the financial constrain measure of exporters relative to non
exporters. If export is truly beneficial then we expect β to be significantly different from
zero.
As highlighted by estimated coefficients in Table 4 we do not find any evidence to
support the idea that exporting improves firm access to external financial funds. We look
at the growth of financial variables over a very short time span, namely between the first
year of entry and the following year, and also over 3- and 5-year periods. In none of the
cases is the export dummy significant. Arguably, this does not necessarily means that
exporting does not affect financial health, but simply that beneficial effects do not appear
within a 5-year horizon. Data limitations prevent us from looking at longer horizons, since
we would end up with too few observations.
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Table 4: Measuring ex-post effects
Score A Liquidity ratio
t t+ 1 t+ 1 t t+ 1 t+ 1
t+ 1 t+ 3 t+ 5 t+ 1 t+ 3 t+ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Export 0 0.023 0.038 0.038 -0.015 -0.049
[0.013] [0.022] [0.034] [0.033] [0.059] [0.089]
log Emplt=0 -0.014 -0.001 0.022 -0.039 0.001 0.001
[0.009] [0.013] [0.018] [0.026] [0.039] [0.052]
log TFPt=0 -0.181*** 0.073 -0.074 0.047 -0.115 -0.301
[0.034] [0.058] [0.082] [0.092] [0.161] [0.223]
Observations 4,391 1,836 1,164 3,321 1,462 913
R-squared 0.052 0.085 0.112 0.042 0.089 0.141
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Equation (3) is estimated on the sample comprising export starters and never exporting
firms only, but this time we have only retained successful entrants, i.e. only those firms
that do not exit from foreign markets. Results are qualitatively unchanged if they are
included: their exclusion should make easier to find an ex post benefit since the sample is
biased in favor of the most successful firms.
In Section 2 above we have discussed two possible reasons why exporting may exert a
positive effect on firm financial health, namely a diversification effect and a signaling effect.
In both cases one could argue that the mere fact of selling part of the production above
is not sufficient to trigger those beneficial effect, but rather there is a sort of threshold
effect below which export does not count. In other words, it seems natural to look at
whether export intensity plays a role in the game or not. As already mentioned, Campa
and Shaver (2002) fail to find a relation between the share of sales to foreign customers
and financial constraints, while Greenaway et al. (2007) disregard the issue.
To complement our analysis we augment equation (3) with the log of export intensity,
defined as export over sales. Results, presented in Table 5 are less clear-cut that before,
but point in the same direction. As one can see from Column (1) of the Table, in the first
year after entry into export markets, higher export intensity is actually associated with an
improvement of financial health as measured by Score A. Yet, this phenomenon appears
short-lived: in fact it disappears when we move to longer time horizons. Furthermore,
higher export intensity is not associated with more liquidity, not even in the first year after
exporting. Thus, overall we do not find any compelling evidence that export participation
improves firm financial health in the short and medium term. The result is confirmed when
we re-estimate equation (3) on a subsample comprising only non exporting firms and those
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export starters characterized by an export intensity larger than the sector median. Results
(not reported) mimic those already presented in Table 4 and therefore do not provide any
support to the existence of a beneficial effect of exporting on financial health.
Table 5: Measuring ex-post effects controlling for export intensity
Score A Liquidity ratio
t t+ 1 t+ 1 t t+ 1 t+ 1
t+ 1 t+ 3 t+ 5 t+ 1 t+ 3 t+ 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Export -0.013 0.023 0.048 0.052 -0.004 -0.008
[0.014] [0.023] [0.035] [0.037] [0.063] [0.093]
log Emplt=0 -0.014 -0.001 0.021 -0.039 0.001 -0.004
[0.009] [0.013] [0.018] [0.026] [0.039] [0.052]
log TFPt=0 -0.182*** 0.073 -0.070 0.049 -0.111 -0.288
[0.034] [0.058] [0.082] [0.092] [0.162] [0.223]
log (Exp Int)t=0 0.136** -0.002 -0.114 -0.153 -0.111 -0.533
[0.069] [0.087] [0.125] [0.177] [0.238] [0.346]
Observations 4,391 1,836 1,164 3,321 1,462 913
R-squared 0.053 0.085 0.113 0.042 0.089 0.143
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
5 Modelling the decision to start exporting
Firm export behavior must ultimately be conceived as a series of decisions regarding both
participation to export markets and the firm’s commitment to international trade. These
decisions can be modelled as the outcome of a variety of factors. Heterogeneity of firm
productivity levels is the utmost explanation for the observed differences in export behavior
across firms. Because firms are heterogeneous in their productive efficiency, they all have
an idiosyncratic ability to cope with the sunk costs associated with entry into export
markets. Yet this may not exhaust the explanation The firm’s ability to access external
financial resources may well constitute another important part of the story. In this section,
we investigate the factors driving firm decisions to enter into export market in the first
place, to then analyze the determinants of export intensity. Taking stocks of our previous
findings, we expect financial constraints to be an important driver of export behavior by
firms, controlling for other important factors such as productivity, human capital and firm
size, and mobilize two series of specifications that account for time duration and selection
biases, respectively.
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5.1 Accounting for time duration to export markets
To model firm entry decision into foreign markets in terms of time duration is tantamount
to equating firm growth with entry into export markets. French data reveal that 70%
of firms with more than 20 employees will ultimately penetrate foreign markets. This
proportion increases to 95% for large firms (i.e. with more than 500 employees). This
suggests that entry into export markets by firms is a necessary —yet significant— step
for growth. Hence the relevant issue is not so much whether firms enter into export
market. Rather, the issue is one of time duration and the time length is takes for a firm
to eventually reach foreign destinations. This Section tackles this issue explicitly using
discrete time duration models.
We estimate a duration model for grouped data following the approach first introduced
by Prentice and Gloeckler (1978). Suppose there are firms i = 1, . . . , N , that enter the
industry at time t = 0. The hazard rate function for firm i at time t and t = 1, ..., T to
start exporting is assumed to take the proportional hazard form: θit = θ0(t) ·X
′
itβ, where
θ0 (t) is the baseline hazard function and Xit is a series of time-varying covariates. More
precisely, let X = {EMP ;WPE;TFP ;Subs;FIN}, where EMP stands for employment
weighted by the numbers of hours worked, WPE is the wage bill per employee in order to
control for systematic differences between firms in terms of human capital, TFP is total
factor productivity, Subs is set to unity if firms has one or more subsidiaries and FIN
is a measure of financial constraints. The discrete time formulation of the hazard rate of
first export for firm i in time interval t is given by a complementary log logistic function
such as:
ht (Xit) = 1− exp
{
− exp
(
X
′
itβ + θ(t)
)}
(4)
where θ(t) is the baseline hazard function relating the hazard rate ht (Xit) at the t
th
interval with the spell duration (Jenkins, 1995). Finally, we model the baseline hazard
function by using the log-transformed of θ(t), an integer counting the number of years
of presence in the market. This choice is discrete-time counterpart of a continuous-time
specification with a Weibull hazard function.16
This model can be extended to account for unobserved heterogeneity —or ‘frailty’, to
account for systematic differences between firms.17 In a way, the inclusion of unobserved
heterogeneity is a generalization of a pooled specification ignoring it. First, it allows
16We have experimented for alternative specifications, namely the semi-parametric, polynomial specifica-
tion using time together with its squared θ(t)2 and cubic values θ(t)3, and a fully non-parametric approach
using duration-interval-specific dummy variables. Because this choice does not affect the conclusions, we
do not report the results from these specifications, but they are available on request.
17The term ‘frailty’ comes from medical sciences where it represents the unobserved propensity to expe-
rience an adverse health event.
15
the omitted variable bias and controls for measurement errors in observed survival times
and regressors (Jenkins, 1995). Suppose that unobserved heterogeneity is described by a
random variable εi independent of Xit. The proportional hazard form with unobserved
heterogeneity can now be written as:
ht (Xit) = 1− exp
{
− exp
(
X
′
itβ + θ(t)
)
+ εi
}
(5)
where εi is an unobserved individual-specific error term with zero mean, uncorrelated with
the X’s. Model (5) can be estimated using standard random effects panel data methods
for a binary dependent variable, under the assumption that some distribution is provided
for the unobserved term. In our case, we will assume that the εi are distributed Normal
and Gamma (See Jenkins, 1995, for more details). Note that our comments will focus
on the Gamma distribution exclusively, and other estimates are provided as robustness
checks.18 Lastly, we perform a likelihood ratio test between the unrestricted model (with
unobserved heterogeneity) and the restricted model (without unobserved heterogeneity)
to test for the relevance of unobserved frailty. The reported estimates are chosen from the
log likelihood ratio test (LR test).
The results are displayed in Table 6, where Score A and the liquidity ratio have been
used as proxies for financial constraints. The first two columns provide estimate for dis-
crete the duration model for pooled data. Columns (3) to (6) display the estimated
parameter controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, which is sequentially assumed to be
normal distributed (columns 3 and 4) and Gamma distributed (columns 5 and 6). Gener-
ally speaking, all specifications exhibit strong consistency in the direction and significance
of the parameter estimates. Observing the significance of the LR test, we comment on the
specification controlling for unobserved heterogeneity exclusively.
Particularly satisfactory is the consistency and significance of the two measures of
financial constraints. Both suggest that financially healthy firms find it easier to start
exporting. To put it differently, availability of financial resources shortens then time
leading to first export. In a way, this should come as no surprise. Both the theoretical
and empirical literature insist on the sunk costs implied by the expansion of activities
abroad. Hence firms with stronger financial resources should be in a better position
to cope with the extra costs —with no immediate compensation— associated with first
exports. One surprise comes from the counter-intuitive sign of TFP, implying that more
productive firms are less likely to enter into export markets. Although apparently at odds
18This choice is arbitrary. As of today, there is no particular reason to prefer the assumption of a
Gamma-distributed frailty over the normal distributed one. This choice is mainly motivated by the fact
that the Gamma distribution is particularly convenient to manipulate and has thus been the most popular.
As displayed in Table 6, results under the alternative assumption are in all respect consistent with the
Gamma assumption.
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Table 6: Estimating the hazard rate of entry into export markets
Pooled Normal RE† Gamma RE‡
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log Empl. 0.109 0.111 0.174 0.176 0.215 0.216
[0.018]*** [0.018]*** [0.029]*** [0.029]*** [0.034]*** [0.033]***
log (Wage/Empl.) 0.829 0.832 0.972 0.971 1.010 1.009
[0.051]*** [0.051]*** [0.073]*** [0.071]*** [0.071]*** [0.071]***
log TFP -0.463 -0.469 -0.465 -0.476 -0.431 -0.439
[0.076]*** [0.076]*** [0.091]*** [0.089]*** [0.096]*** [0.094]***
Subsid. -0.029 -0.028 -0.047 -0.046 -0.058 -0.058
[0.041] [0.041] [0.046] [0.046] [0.049] [0.049]
Score A 0.012 0.016 0.017
[0.006]** [0.007]** [0.008]**
Liquidity Ratio 0.012 0.166 0.175
[0.004]*** [0.039]*** [0.041]***
Observations 35,794 35,794 35,794 35,794 35,794 35,794
Firms 12,193 12,193 12,193 12,193
LR test§ 18.01*** 17.65*** 28.24*** 27.96***
Standard errors in brackets; sector and time dummies included
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
† Random Effect model with Normal distributed frailty
‡ Random Effect model with Gamma distributed frailty
§ Likelihood Ratio test for unobserved frailty; H0: non significant unobserved frailty
with the theoretical literature (Melitz, 2003), this results is consistent with Bellone et al.
(2008b), where a U-shaped productivity pattern is revealed for future French exporters.19
Lastly, both size and human capital, i.e. respectively employment and wage per employee,
have the expected sign. These estimates imply that large firms intensive in human capital
are more likely to go abroad.
Using model (5), Table 7 displays the estimated baseline hazard function for the rep-
resentative firm. Note that in using a discrete time duration specification, hazard rates
can be interpreted as probabilities of entry into export markets. First, we observe that
the hazard rate function is monotonically decreasing in time, implying that the propensity
of entry into export market is larger for young firms. This suggests that firms failing to
expand abroad in their early years will find it increasingly difficult to start exporting. We
observe that the probability of entry into export markets is 34% at the year of entry into
the industry altogether, to reach 21% after year 13. Second, Table 7 also displays the
19The paper shows that future exporters outperform their non exporting counterparts five years prior to
entry into export market. But in their preparation to first export, firm productivity is found to temporarily
decreases to then recover contemporaneously with entry. The interpretation is that the benefits from sales
to foreign markets accrue at the time of entry, boosting the firm’s level of productivity.
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Table 7: Estimated hazard rate of entry into export markets by deciles of explanatory variables
Time Baseline Size Human Capital TFP Financial constraints
(in years) Hazard 1st decile 9th decile 1st decile 9th decile 1st decile 9th decile 1st decile 9th decile
1 0.343 0.308 0.395 0.089 0.604 0.370 0.318 0.331 0.354
2 0.301 0.270 0.349 0.077 0.547 0.326 0.279 0.291 0.312
3 0.279 0.250 0.324 0.070 0.515 0.302 0.258 0.269 0.289
4 0.264 0.236 0.307 0.066 0.492 0.286 0.244 0.255 0.274
5 0.253 0.226 0.295 0.063 0.475 0.274 0.234 0.244 0.262
6 0.244 0.218 0.285 0.060 0.461 0.265 0.225 0.235 0.253
7 0.237 0.211 0.277 0.058 0.449 0.257 0.219 0.228 0.245
8 0.230 0.205 0.270 0.057 0.440 0.250 0.213 0.222 0.239
9 0.225 0.201 0.263 0.055 0.431 0.245 0.208 0.217 0.234
10 0.220 0.196 0.258 0.054 0.423 0.240 0.203 0.212 0.229
11 0.216 0.193 0.253 0.053 0.417 0.235 0.200 0.208 0.224
12 0.213 0.189 0.249 0.052 0.410 0.231 0.196 0.205 0.221
13 0.209 0.186 0.245 0.051 0.405 0.227 0.193 0.202 0.217
The table uses estimates from model (5) of table 6 .
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hazard function for firms located in the 1st and 9th decile of each significant explanatory
variables, holding all other firm characteristics constant. For simplicity, we choose to com-
ment year 5 exclusively. We observe the followings: firms located at the 9th decile of Size
(log of employees) are 30% more likely to enter into export markets; firms located at the
9th decile of Human Capital (Wage per employee) are 7 times more likely to enter into
export markets than firms in the first decile; firms located at the 9th decile of financial
constraints (Score A) are 7% more likely to enter into export markets.
The prominent role of human capital is suggestive that the variable serves as a proxy
for a series of unobserved characteristics, such as informal personal ties, reputation, and
the like. These unobserved characteristics are likely to become crucial when establishing
activities in foreign countries. Turning to the effect of financial constraints, its limited
magnitude (7%) leads us to conclude that if their effect is statistically significant, its
economic relevance is somewhat limited as compared with other variables. To recapitulate,
we find that financial constraints are a significant determinant of firm export decision, but
that as firm size, the impact of financial constraints upon the probability of exporting is
far less important than the firm’s endowment in human capital and skills. Next Section
extends the analysis to investigate the role of financial constraints on firm-level export
intensity.
5.2 Accounting for initial export intensity
Here, we tackle the issue of the relationship between financial constraints and export
volume at the year of entry. Because positive exports implies that non-exporters be
excluded from the sample of analysis, one must first correct for sample selection bias and
depict in the qualitative equation the probability of being an exporter. In other words,
explaining firm commitment to export markets necessarily calls for a broader investigation
explaining why firms choose to expand their activities abroad in the first place. First, firms
must decide whether to export and, conditional on this decision, they set the volume of
their production to sell abroad. We model these two decisions by means of a Heckman
model as follows
yit = Xi,t−sβ + σ
′λ
(
X′i,t−sβˆ
′
)
+ νi (6)
where i stands for firm i, t stands for year t, y is export intensity, X is the vector of
explanatory variables as previously defined, β is the vector of parameter of interest and ν
is an error term.20
20The Heckman specification augments the model by adding the inverse Mill’s ratio λ(X′i,t−sβˆ
′), where
βˆ′ is obtained from the first step probit regression of export decision on X′, a vector of variables describing
the determinants of export entry, which may or may not be equal to X. In the present case, we set X ≡ X′.
Parameter σ′ is then used to estimate ρ, a measure of selection bias correction.
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Table 8: Entry and export intensity: Heckman Two-Step model
s = 1 s = 3
Export Export Export Export Export Export Export Export
decision intensity decision intensity decision intensity decision intensity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
log Emplt−s 0.047 -0.032 0.052 -0.038 0.067 -0.007 0.072 -0.02
[0.031] [0.069] [0.031]* [0.070] [0.052] [0.112] [0.052] [0.113]
log TFPt−s -0.569 -0.117 -0.531 -0.214 -0.567 -0.946 -0.477 -0.936
[0.124]*** [0.373] [0.123]*** [0.355] [0.232]** [0.537]* [0.232]** [0.505]*
log (Wage/Empl)t−s 0.511 0.333 0.514 0.361 0.134 0.555 0.130 0.551
[0.085]*** [0.297] [0.085]*** [0.297] [0.154] [0.303]* [0.154] [0.303]*
Subsid.t−s 0.311 0.030 0.312 0.054 0.106 0.135 0.119 0.123
[0.060]*** [0.198] [0.060]*** [0.198] [0.091] [0.204] [0.091] [0.207]
Score At−s 0.028 -0.059 0.044 -0.035
[0.010]*** [0.025]** [0.017]** [0.041]
Liquidity ratiot−s 0.102 -0.308 0.079 -0.301
[0.054]* [0.124]** [0.099] [0.196]
Observations 5727 5727 2169 2169
Wald χ2 883.60*** 881.33*** 586.05*** 581.03***
ρ -0.169 -0.111 -0.046 -0.053
Standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Models include a vector of sector and time dummies
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Table 8 reports the results for both the selection equation explaining the decision of
entry into export markets and the quantitative equation explaining export intensity at
both time t − 1 and time t − 3. Again, we use both Score A and liquidity as proxies
for financial constraints. Altogether, the qualitative equation shows consistency with the
previous results concerning wage per employee and financial constraints, whereas the role
of size vanishes. Looking at the quantitative equation at time t − 1, the striking result
is the switch in sign regarding financial constraints. Financially healthy firms are more
likely to enter into export markets, but conditional on the decision to export entry, firms
which commit more to international trade appear to be financially more constrained. We
interpret these results as the fact that export intensity is also an indirect measure of sunk
entry costs into export markets. The rationale for this is that export intensity increases
with the number of foreign markets served by the firms. If some sunk costs may be shared
across markets (e.g. to build a department dedicated to international trade), a substantial
share of these costs are likely to be replicated for each country of destinations (e.g. the
study the conformity of the manufactured product with regulatory environment). Hence if
sunk entry costs increase with export intensity, the relationship between export intensity
and financial constrained should indeed be negative.
The above remarks should call for caution. Our interpretation suggest that financial
constraints suffer from a strong endogeneity problem yielding this negative association
with export intensity. Importantly, the endogeneity problem is essentially caused by the
simultaneous relationship between sunk costs of entry into export markets and financial
health. Hence in order to control for that, we lag all explanatory variables three years.21
We find that three (five) years before entry, financially healthy firms find it easier to enter
into export markets, but financial constraints are not associated with the choice of export
intensity.
To recapitulate, financial health is an important determinant of the decision to enter
into export markets made by firms. But firm commitment to foreign markets is chosen
irrespective of financial health. The choices about the volume of export and the number of
markets served are not driven by the availability of external financial resources. However,
once the decision to export is validated, the appearance of the negative association between
financial constraints and export intensity is suggestive that firms have to cope with extra
expenditures to finance sunk entry costs into export markets. This decline in financial
health may create transitory difficulties for future exporters, which may become more
fragile, at least in the short run.
21We also experimented for a five-year lag but since the results are strictly equivalent to those using a
three-year lag, we report the results for a three-year lag exclusively.
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6 Conclusion
In the last 10 years or so, a large empirical literature has emerged that studies the peculiar
characteristics of exporting firms. Two broad stylized facts emerge: exporters perform
substantially better than their non exporting competitors; there are wide cross-country
differences in firm export behavior. This paper adds to this stream of the literature by
looking at financial factors as a key determinant of firm decisions. More specifically, we
investigate whether limited access to external financial resources may prevent firms from
expanding their activities abroad, and whether internationalization has any positive effect
on financial health.
We find strong evidence that less credit constrained firms self-select into export markets
or, from a complementary point of view, that external funds are an important determinant
of firm export status. In fact, export starters display better financial health than their
non exporting competitors even before starting to operate abroad. On the contrary, the
hypothesis that internationalization leads to better access to financial markets finds very
limited support. In truth, firms heavily engaged in export activities appear to enjoy better
financial health in the year after entry into foreign markets, but this phenomenon is short-
lived and not particularly robust. Consistently with our previous findings, we observe that
access to external financial resources is an important but not crucial determinant of the
probability to start exporting. We find no evidence of a positive relationship between fi-
nancial health and commitment to international trade. Conversely, higher export intensity
is associated with lower financial health. This result is only apparently paradoxical since
it corroborates the idea that the relevance of financial constraints is due to the presence of
sunk entry costs. Since higher export intensity can be regarded as a proxy for the number
of foreign markets served by a firm (Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007), exporting a higher share
of production entails facing higher sunk entry costs (assuming that at least part of them
are destination-specific), which drives down financial health.
All in all, we conclude that our empirical analysis supports recent models of inter-
national trade based on firm heterogeneity and sunk entry costs. In this context public
intervention can be called upon to help efficient but constrained firms expand their activ-
ities abroad. More work needs to be done to investigate whether financial factors affect
differently various types of firms, for instance resulting disproportionately more binding
for small and young enterprises. Yet, the results presented in the paper already point to
some policy conclusions. Indeed, the relevance of financial constraints in determining firm
export behavior suggests that actions aimed either at reducing financial market imper-
fections or at lowering the sunk entry costs into foreign markets will be more successful
in triggering export penetration than interventions providing guidance and support to
existing exporters.
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